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This  paper  uses  what  could  be  called  a  multi-school  approach  to 
poverty  policy,  asking  the  following  question:  Given  the  many 
proposed  causes  for  poverty,  and  the  conflicting  theories  about  how 
potential  solutions  would  work,  what  conclusions  can  we  draw 
about  policy?  This  paper  concludes  that  the  Guaranteed  Income  is 
the  most  efficient  and  comprehensive  policy  to address  poverty. 
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Unemployment Now,  that  we  have  had  Welfare  reform  we  need  Welfare  reform  more  than 
ever.  In August  of  1996,  President  Clinton  signed  into  law  a Welfare.  reform  plan 
ending  sixty  years  of  social  Welfare  policy.  Since  the  passage  of  the  Social 
Security  Act  of  1935,  impoverished  Americans  had  a  statutory  right  to 
governmental  assistance.  Now,  in addition  to  turning  Welfare  over  to  the  states, 
the  law  removes  the  guarantee  of  assistance.  The  needy  can  simply  be  turned 
away  if, they  appeal  to  the  government  for  help  during  hard  times.  The  debate 
which  led  to  President  Clinton’s  signing  of this  legislation,  as  well  as  the  current 
discussion  about  how  best  to  implement  it,  highlights  the  issue  of  how  best  to 
attack  poverty. 
We  can  eliminate  poverty  in  the  U.S.  Despite  all  of  the  talk  of  an 
economic  slow  down,  we  are  wealthier  today  than  we  have  ever  been.  The  talk 
of  a slow  down  only  refers  to  a decrease  in the  rate  of  growth,  but  our  economy 
continues  to  grow  faster  than  our  population.  Yet  the  poverty  rate  has  been 
stagnant  or  increasing  for  the  last  20  years.  This  is  in  contrast  to  comparable 
nations  that  have  been  able  to  nearly  eliminate  poverty  (e.g.,  Sweden  and 
1 Norway).  We  could  do  as  well  or  better  if  we  had  a  more  coherent  and 
comprehensive  poverty  policy. 
In this  paper,  we  will  make  the  case  that  the  Guaranteed  Income  (in  any 
of  its  various  versions:  e.g.,  negative  income  tax,  basic  income,  or  the  social 
dividend)  is  the  most  efficient  and  comprehensive  method  to  attack  poverty.  In 
part  1, we  define  poverty  and  our  goal  for  poverty  policy.  In  part  2,  we  critically 
examine  five  theories  of  the  causes  of  poverty:  the  physical  inability  to  work, 
single  parenthood,  inadequate  demand  for  labor,  inadequate  human  capital,  and 
a  poor  work  ethic.  In  part  three  we  critically  discuss  six  policy  strategies  for 
fighting  poverty:  promotion  of  economic  growth,  Workfare,  the  minimum  wage, 
separating  the  “deserving”  from  the  “undeserving”  poor,  publicly  guaranteed 
employment,  and  publicly  Guaranteed  Income.  We  assess  how  well  each  of 
these  programs  address  the  five  proposed  causes  of  poverty,  making  the  case 
that  the  most  efficient  and  effective  of these  is the  Guaranteed  Income. 
THE  DEFINITION  OF  POVERTY  AND  THE  GOAL  OF  POVERTY  POLICY 
There  are  two  different  definitions  of  poverty:  “absolute”  and  “relative.” 
Poverty,  according  to  the  absolute  definition,  is the  lack  of  resources  necessary 
to  meet  one’s  basic  needs.  According  to  the  relative  definition,  poverty  is  the 
possession  of a  level  of  resources  which  is less  than  some  specific  proportion  of 
the  level  of  resources  possessed  by  the  average  person.  According  to  the 
absolute  definition,  “the  poverty  line”  is  the  amount  of  income  needed  for  a 
person  or  family  to  purchase  their  minimum  needs  for  food,  shelter,  and 
2 clothing.’  A  family  with  less  income  than  the  poverty  line  is  considered  to  be 
living  in  poverty.  This  is  the  definition  we  use.  We  do  so  because  we  think  the 
relative  conception  is  really  about  another  important  social  issue:  this  is  the 
issue  of  inequality.  Instead  of addressing  this  issue  here,  we  leave  it for  a future 
work.  Our  first  priority  should  be  to  meet  everyone’s  basic  needs  before 
addressing  the  question  of whether  everyone  is getting  a fair  amount  of  luxuries. 
Just  exactly  how  best  to  calculate  the  poverty  line  is  the  focus  of 
considerable  debate  (Schiller,  1989;  Schwarz  and  Volgy,  1992,  and  Mishel  and 
Bernstein,  1994)  but  that  is not  the  focus  of this  paper  either.  For  our  purposes, 
we  accept  the  government’s  standard  of the  poverty  line. 
Although  the  goal  one  has  for  policy  is  closely  linked  to  the  particular 
policy  one  chooses  to  achieve  that  goal,  it is  important  to  define  both  separately. 
This  allows  us to evaluate  how  well  different  policies  achieve  the  same  goal. 
We  believe  that  there  is  a  broad  consensus  among  all  but  the  most 
radical  property  rights  advocates  that  the  ultimate  goal  of  policy  should  be  to 
reduce  poverty  as  much  as  possible  and  eliminate  it  if  we  can.  Bob  Dole 
exemplified  this  consensus  in  the  1998  presidential  debates  when  he  said,  “this 
is America,  nobody’s  going  to  starve.”  That  statement  is non-controversial  even 
1  Medical  care, though  important  to one’s standard  of living,  we treat  as a separate  issue. 
One related  problem that we will  not be discussing  in this  paper is someone  who is impoverished 
because  of health  expenses  owed by them  or a member  of their  family  for a condition  that  does 
not prevent  them  from  working.  Providing  adequate  affordable  health  care to  all  citizens  is an 
important  public  policy question,  but it is best addressed  as a separate  issue. in  partisan  debates;  thus,  we  evaluate  all  policies  on  how  effectively  and 
efficiently  they  reduce  poverty.  The  wide  differences  of  opinion  about  poverty 
policy  reflect  differences  about  how  best  to  achieve  that  goal,  which  in  turn 
depend  on  people’s  beliefs  about  the  causes  of poverty. 
VIEWS  ON  THE  CAUSES  OF  POVERTY 
There  are  many  differing  views  on  the  cause  or  causes  of  poverty, 
including  the  physical  inability  to work,  inadequate  demand  for  labor,  inadequate 
human  capital,  lack  of  work  ethic,  and  single  parenthood.  There  is  no  clear 
consensus  about  the  relative  importance  of  each  of  these  possible  causes.  We 
discuss  all  of them  and  then  discuss  our  own  view. 
A.  Physical  lnabilitv  to Work 
Some  people  are  physically  incapable  of  holding  a  job  and,  hence, 
providing  for  their  own  subsistence  because  of  old  age  or  disability.  Disabilities 
can  be  the  result  of  a  birth  defect  or  an  injury.  They  can  be  either  physical  or 
mental,  including  retardation  or  mental  illness.  Although  this  is in some  ways  the 
most  straight  forward  and  widely  accepted  cause  of  poverty,  there  is 
considerable  gray  area  as  to  how  disabled  one  must  be  to  be  incapable  of 
working  (Dolgoff,  Feldstein,  and  Skolnik,  1993).  According  to  the  House 
Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  (1992),  the  official  definition  of  disability  is, 
“Those  unable  to  engage  in  any  substantial  gainful  activity  by  reason  of medically  determined  physical  or  mental  impairment  expected  to  result  in  death 
or  that  has  lasted  or  can  be  expected  to  last  for  a  continuous  period  of  at  least 
12 months.”  Problems  with  this  definition  include,  at what  age  is a person  too  old 
to work?  At what  I.Q.  is a person  considered  mentally  retarded? 
B. Sinale-Parenthood 
A  single  parent,  especially  of  an  infant,  is  faced  with  the  problem  of 
having  full  time  demands  on  them  outside  of  work.  One  cause  of  poverty  could 
be  that  single  parents  cannot  afford  the  time  away  from  their  children  to  work 
(Ellwood,  1988).  Diane  Pearce  (1978)  found  that  female  headed  families  have 
become  a  disproportionate  share  of  the  impoverished  population.  William  Kelso 
(1994)  tells  us  that,  between  1960  and  1991,  the  percentage  of  poor  families 
headed  by  single  women  increased  from  18.3%  to  38.7%.  There  is 
disagreement,  however,  as  to  whether  this  should  be  viewed  as  a  root  cause  of 
poverty  or  not  (Mishel  and  Bernstein,  1994  and  Garfinkel  and  McLanahan, 
1986).  If  single  parenthood  does  cause  poverty,  the  root  cause  is  whatever 
makes  people  become  single  parents.  Are  they  people  in  unfortunate 
circumstances  or  people  who  have  deliberately  chosen  their  position?  Some 
authors  (Magnet,  1993,  Murray,  1984,  and  Tanner  1996)  argue  that  Welfare 
itself  causes  single  parenthood  by  encouraging  women  who  would  not  otherwise 
become  single  parents  to  do  so.  According  to  Marlene  Kim  (1997)  while  most 
single-parents  with  children  under  age  six  did  not  work,  46%  of  those  who  did 
work  had  incomes  below  the  poverty  line.  We  could  conclude  from  this  that  the reason  that  so  many  single-parents  do  not  work  is  because  if they  do  they  have 
a high  probability  of still  being  in poverty. 
C.  Inadequate  Demand  for  Labor 
According  to  this  view,  the  demand  for  labor  is presently  not  high  enough 
to  employ,  at  above  poverty  wages,  all  those  who  are  willing  and  able  to  supply 
their  labor.  Two  consequences  can  follow  from  this:  high  unemployment  or  low 
wage  employment.  Keep  in  mind  that,  according  to  this  view,  low  wage 
employment  is caused  not  by  lack  of  human  capital  but  by  inadequate  demand. 
Just  as  is the  case  in any  other  market,  when  demand  is  less  than  supply,  there 
is  downward  pressure  on  price,  which  in  this  case  is  the  wage  (Harvey,  1989; 
Harrison  and  Bluestone,  1990;  Rose,  1994;  and  Wilson,  1996). 
Unemployment  occurs  when  the  demand  for  labor  is  less  than  the  supply 
of  labor  at  the  going  wage.  According  to  the  U.S.  Department  of 
Commerce/Bureau  of  the  Census’  (1996)  definition  of  unemployment,  not 
everyone  who  is “not  employed”  is “unemployed.”  In order  to  be  unemployed  one 
has  to  be willing,  able,  and  looking  to  work  at  the  going  wage,  but  unable  to  find 
it. A  person  can  only  be  unemployed  in this  sense  if there  is inadequate  demand 
for  her  labor  at the  going  wage. 
Neoclassical  theory  rejects  the  idea  that  unemployment  can  exist  for  very 
long.  According  to  this  view,  what  appears  to  be  unemployment  is really  a result 
of  people  choosing  not  to  sell  their  labor  at  the  going  wage.  When  demand  for 
labor  is low wages  simply  fall  until  an  equilibrium  is reached  in which  all  workers 
6 who  are  willing  to  work  can  find  a job.  In  other  words,  if  more  workers  want  to 
work  than  there  are  jobs,  the  wage  will  simply  fall  until  no  one  wants  those  jobs 
anymore  (Munday,  1996).  But,  even  if  an  equilibrium  can  be  shown  to  exists 
there  is  no  reason  given  to  believe  that  the  equilibrium  wage  will  be  a  living 
wage. 
Both  of  these  situations  could  leave  one  sector  of  the  population  in 
poverty.  In other  words,  there  is no  economic  theory  that  everyone  who  wants  to 
work  can  find  a job  that  pays  above  poverty  wages.  In history,  and  in most  of the 
world  today,  there  are  more  examples  of nations  with  a poverty  wage  sector  than 
there  are  nations  that  employ  everyone  at  living  wages.  It has  been  pointed  out 
at  least  as  long  ago  as  Adam  Smith  (1776)  and  by  many  others  since,  that 
workers  have  a disadvantageous  position  in the  labor  market  because  they  need 
a job  to  survive  but  the  owners  of  natural  resources  do  not  need  employees  to 
survive.  This  could  explain  the  tendency  for  wages  to  be  low  in  at  least  some 
sectors  of the  economy.  However,  this  cause  of  poverty  tends  to  be  overlooked, 
and  we  caution  that  any  poverty  policy  should  be  evaluated  by  its  effect  on  the 
market  power  of  laborers. 
D. Low  Level  of  Human  Capital 
Human  capital  refers  to  the  skills,  knowledge,  and  abilities  that  make 
people  more  productive  on  the  job.  If the  labor  market  is  competitive,  economic 
theory  predicts  that  the  people  with  more  human  capital  will  find  more  work  and 
better  paying  jobs.  This  theory  is the  basis  for  one  influential  view  of  the  cause 
7 of  poverty:  people  with  poor  skills  end  up  either  unemployed  or  employed  in  low 
wage  jobs  (Atkinson,  1983;Becker,  1993;  and  Ehrenberg  and  Smith,  1994). 
E. Lack  of Work  Ethic 
Some  people  may  choose  to  behave  in  ways  that  cause  their  own 
poverty.  For  example,  Lawrence  Mead  (1986)  contends  that  an  insufficient  work 
ethic  causes  poverty.  Able-bodied  persons  might  choose  not  to  work  because 
they  would  rather  stay  home,  or  they  may  choose  not  to  work  hard  and  find  it 
hard  to  hold  a job.  Individuals  who  chose  not  to  work  are  considered  “out  of  the 
labor  force,”  because  they  voluntarily  chose  not  to  participate  at the  going  wage. 
F. Our  View  of the  Causes  of  Poverty 
As  we  see  it,  all  of  the  factors  mentioned  in the  previous  sections  should 
be  considered.  The  causes  of  poverty  are  many  and  complex,  but  the  symptom 
is  simple;  people  are  poor  if they  do  not  have  enough  money  to  buy  the  basic 
necessities  of  life.  Because  the  problem  has  many  possible  causes  we  would  be 
ill  advised  to  ignore  any  of  them.  We  believe  that  a  significant  problem  of 
formulating  effective  public  policy  is  caused  by  the  fact  that  many  people  on  all 
sides  of  the  political  spectrum  find  it  appealing  to  focus  on  only  one  or  a  few 
causes.  The  left  tends  to focus  on  unemployment  while  the  right  tends  to  believe 
that  people  do  not  value  work  enough.  What  tends  to  be  left  out  of  the 
discussion  is  that  the  extent  to  which  people  value  work  depends  upon  wages 
and  working  conditions.  People  may  not  value  work,  not  because  they  lack  the work  ethic,  not  because  the  alternatives  are  too  appealing,  but  because  the  jobs 
available  are  not  rewarding. 
Policies  should  be  evaluated  on  the  basis  of  their  effects  on  the  living 
standards  of the  working  poor,  the  living  standards  of those  who  do  not  work  and 
the  size  of  each  group.  In  1995  (the  latest  year  for  which  data  are  available), 
there  were  1.4  million  families  with  at  least  one  year  round  full-time  worker  with 
incomes  below  the  poverty  level  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce/Bureau  of  the 
Census,  1996).  10  percent  of  working  adults  have  incomes  below  the  poverty 
line  and  another  8Oh have  incomes  less  than  50%  above  the  poverty  line  (Kim, 
1997).  The  problem  we  address  in  the  next  section  is  to  design  a  policy  that 
takes  all  of  the  causes  of  poverty  into  account.  Even  though  the  problem  is 
complex,  the  solution  must  be  simple  enough  to  be  politically  manageable.  We 
should  focus  on  treating  the  symptom,  but  look  carefully  on  how  well  any 
treatment  of the  symptom  addresses  the  causes. 
SOCIAL  POLICIES  TO  ADDRESS  POVERTY 
In this  section,  we  discuss  six  possible  solutions  to  poverty:  four  aspects 
of  the  current  system  and  two  proposed  reforms.  We  do  so  by  relating  these 
solutions  to  the  different  possible  causes  of  poverty,  evaluating  how  well  they 
combat  these  causes  and  achieve  the  goal  of  cost  effectively  reducing  or 
eliminating  poverty. 
A.  Policv  Aimed  at  Economic  Growth  and  Full  Employment 
9 One  often  cited  approach  is  to  aim  government  policy  at  increasing 
economic  growth,  indirectly  increasing  the  demand  for  labor,  increasing  wages 
and  reducing  poverty.  However,  historically,  growth  has  sometimes  reduced  but 
never  eliminated  poverty.  In  1949,  despite  years  of  sustained  growth  and  the 
highest  per  capita  income  in  the  world,  almost  one  third  (32O/b) of  Americans 
lived  in  poverty  (Levy  1987).  The  greatest  reduction  in  poverty  in  US  history 
happened  in  the  period  1949  to  1973,  falling  from  a  32%  in  1949  to  11 .I %  in 
1973  largely  as  a  result  of  active  government  policy  (Levy  1987).  Since  1973 
there  has  been  a  disturbing  trend  in which  poverty  increased,  despite  sustained 
economic  growth,  creeping  back  up to  14.5%  by  1994  (Gottschalk,  1997). 
Clearly,  economic  growth  on  its own  does  not  eliminate  poverty. 
Why  growth  does  not  eliminate  poverty  is  a  difficult  and  controversial 
question  that  closely  relates  to  the  debate  about  the  cause  of  poverty.  Growth 
cannot  cure  the  disabled.  It  could  provide  more  opportunities  for  the 
unemployed,  but  not  necessarily.  William  Baumol  and  Edward  Wolff  (1996)  find 
that  economic  growth  actually  increases  the  average  level  of  unemployment. 
Constantly  changing  technology,  which  stimulates  growth,  also  tends  to  displace 
labor,  creating  demand  for  new  skills,  making  other  skills  obsolete.  Rebecca 
Blank  (1994)  reminds  us  that  the  poverty  rate  declined  by  little  during  the 
relatively  long  economic  expansion  which  occurred  between  1982  and  late  1990. 
Therefore,  we  believe  that  economic  growth,  though  strongly  desirable,  is  not  a 
solution  to  poverty. 
10 A  similar  belief  is that  the  government  can  use  fiscal  and  monetary  policy 
to  maintain  the  full  employment  level  of  output.  We  believe  that,  like  economic 
growth,  full  employment  is desirable  but  full  employment  alone  is  not  enough  to 
eliminate  poverty.  The  U.S.  government’s  experiments  at  maintaining  full 
employment  have  been  mixed  and  some  economists  believe  that  the  closest 
attainable  approximation  of  it is a 5 percent  unemployment  rate  (Munday,  1996). 
Others  contend  that  it is possible  to  bring  the  unemployment  rate  down  as  low  as 
3 or 4 percent  as  it has  been  at times  in post-war  U.S.  history.  However,  in  1966, 
during  the  Vietnam  War,  the  unemployment  rate  was  only  3.8  percent  but  the 
poverty  rate  was  14.7  percent  (Census  Bureau,  1975).  In  1953,  during  the 
Korean  War,  the  unemployment  rate  was  only  2.9  percent,  the  lowest  rate 
between  the  end  of the  Second  World  War  and  the  present,  yet  the  poverty  rate 
was  26.2  percent  (Murray,  1984).  Explanation  for  this  includes:  even  at  “full 
employment”  there  are  millions  not  working  and  there  can  be  millions  more 
working  at  low wages.  Clearly  full  employment  alone  will  not  eliminate  poverty. 
B. Workfare 
Workfare  is  a  policy  approach,  now  being  implemented  as  part  of  the 
recent  Welfare  reform  legislation.  It  serves  as  a  component  of  The  Temporary 
Assistance  for  Needy  Families  program  (TANF),  formerly  AFDC. 
TANF  recipients  are  required  to work  or  prepare  for  work  in return  for  their 
benefits.  Work  activities  include  working  in  parks,  social  service  agencies  and 
schools.  Preparation  for  work  includes  enrollment  in  secondary  school, 
11 classroom-based  job  training  programs,  and  other  activities,  designed  to  prepare 
people  to  make  the  transition  from  Welfare  to  the  job  market.  TANF  recipients 
who  do  not  take  part  in these  activities  stand  the  risk  of  losing  a  portion  of  their 
benefits.  They  are  paid  less  than  minimum  wage,  and  far  below  the  poverty  line 
(Center  on  Social  Welfare  Policy  and  Law,  1996a).  The  Welfare  reform  law  also 
includes  a five  year  life  time  limit  on  Welfare  benefits  as  an  added  incentive  for 
recipients  to  move  from  Welfare  to  work  (Center  on  Social  Welfare  Policy  and 
Law,  1996b). 
Obviously,  Workfare  does  nothing  for  people  who  are  physically  unable  to 
work.  It  is  usually  viewed  as  part  of  a  more  comprehensive  strategy  along  with 
other  policies  aimed  at those  who  physically  cannot  work. 
Single  parents  are  the  main  recipients  of  Workfare,  but  it  apparently  is 
based  on  the  idea  that  the  demands  of  raising  a  child  is  not  a  root  cause  of 
poverty.  Its  goal  is  to  get  single  parents  into  the  workforce,  assuming  that  the 
reason  they  do  not  work  is  because  they  lack  a  work  ethic  or  adequate  human 
capital.  This  is a departure  from  the  strategy  of AFDC,  which  before  1988  did  not 
require  single  parents  of  children  under  six  to  work  outside  the  home  (Lewis, 
1995).  Workfare  requires  that  single  parents  put  their  children  in someone  else’s 
care  while  they  work.  This  increases  the  cost  of the  program.  Part  of the  strategy 
of  Workfare  seems  to  be  to  discourage  people  from  deciding  to  become  single 
parents,  but  it  does  not  offer  anything  very  attractive  to  people  who  are  single 
parents. 
12 From  the  perspective  of  the  low  level  of  labor  demand  theory  of  poverty, 
the  Workfare  approach  is  unappealing.  In  fact,  it  is  likely  to  hurt  the  working 
poor,  increasing  the  poverty  of  those  regarded  as  the  most  deserving. 
Neoclassical  economic  theory  predicts  that,  all  else  equal,  if Workfare  succeeds 
in moving  more  people  into  the  labor  market,  it will  drive  down  wages.  Keynesian 
theory  predicts  that  new  entrants  will  not  necessarily  be  able  to  find  work. 
Neither  outcome  is  very  attractive.  Since  low-wage  workers  are  already  paid 
poverty  wages,  even  if former  TANF  recipients  can  find  jobs  at  prevailing  wages, 
they  will  still  have  incomes  below  the  poverty  line.  Public  debate  has  focused  on 
the  extent  to  which  Workfare  has  succeeded  in  moving  recipients  from  Welfare 
to  work,  with  very  little  discussion  of  its  impact  on  poverty.  If TANF  succeeds  in 
reducing  Welfare  rolls  by  increasing  the  poverty  of  the  working  poor  it  could 
hardly  be called  a success. 
From  the  low  level  of  human  capital  perspective,  the  Workfare  approach 
could  conceivably  be  viewed  approvingly,  but  it would  take  a  major  revision  of 
the  system  to  be  effective  from  this  perspective.  This  program  is  ostensibly 
designed  to  enhance  the  skills,  work  experience,  and  education  of  Welfare 
recipients.  However,  many  of  the  jobs  Workfare  recipients  are  being  offered, 
such  as  picking  up  garbage  in parks,  do  not  provide  people  with  opportunities  to 
enhance  their  human  capital  at  all.  A  similar  program,  CETA,  was  canceled  in 
the  early  eighties  for  just  such  rationale.  If lack  of  human  capital  is the  cause  of 
poverty,  Workfare  would  need  to  be  completely  overhauled  so  that  the  work 
13 done  by  recipients  was  truly  human  capital  enhancing.  This,  however,  would 
greatly  increase  the  expense  of the  program. 
Supporters  of the  view  that  poverty  is caused  by  the  lack  of  a work  ethic, 
often  advocate  Workfare  because  of  its  potential  to  socialize  the  undeserving 
poor  into  recognizing  the  importance  of work.  The  fact  that  TANF  recipients  are 
denied  assistance  if they  fail  to  show  up  for  Workfare  assignments  provides  a 
powerful  incentive  for  them  to  behave  more  ‘responsibly”  and  go  out  and  get  a 
job.  However,  even  from  this  perspective  there  is  considerable  doubt  about  the 
effectiveness  of  Workfare  because  it  relies  largely  on  negative  incentives. 
Although  they  are  paid  less  than  minimum  wage,  people  on  Workfare  are 
expected  to  work,  but  are  not  considered  “workers;”  they  are  still  treated  as 
“recipients.”  It  has  not  yet  been  established  whether  they  have  the  right  to 
organize,  even  though  some  claim  that  in many  cases,  their  duties  were  formerly 
performed  by  union  workers.  Workfare  offers  its  “recipients”  work  at  poverty 
wages  potentially  for  years.  It is hard  to  see  how  this  will  teach  people  the  value 
of hard  work.  It may  only  teach  them  that  if you’re  willing  to work  hard,  others  will 
take  advantage  of you.  Perhaps,  a program  based  on  positive  incentives  is more 
appropriate. 
The  major  problem  with  Workfare  is  that  it  appears  grounded  on  an 
extreme  version  of the  work  ethic:  a one  sided  moral  obligation  in which  the  poor 
are  obliged  to  work  for  their  subsistence,  but  employers  (whether  private  or 
government)  are  not  obliged  to  pay  subsistence  wages.  Neither  does  it  create 
any  incentive  for  employers  to  pay  living  wages.  In  fact,  much  of  our  recent 
14 Welfare  reform  has  primarily  benefited  low  wage  employers  rather  than  workers 
(Lewis,  1995).  There  are  at  least  two  less  extreme  alternatives.  One  would  be  to 
hold  employers  to  a  reciprocal  moral  obligation;  the  other  is  to  offer  people 
positive  incentives  to work  rather  than  an  obligation. 
The  latest  round  of  Welfare  reform  greatly  over-emphasizes  the  “bad 
values”  explanation  of  poverty;  it ignores  even  the  possibility  that  the  poor  might 
already  have  a  good  work  ethic.  Many,  perhaps  all,  would  be  willing  to  work  if 
they  had  enough  incentive  to  do  so,  but  wages  are  so  low  that  there  is  little 
incentive  to  do  so.  Our  current  strategy  treats  this  by  making  not-working  less 
attractive  rather  than  by  making  work  more  attractive.  In  other  words,  we  make 
people  more  willing  to work  for  below  poverty  wages.  This  probably  will  succeed 
in increasing  work,  but  it will  not  succeed  in helping  the  poor. 
The  available  evidence  suggest  that  Welfare  recipients  who  have  been 
participants  in Workfare  programs  are  not  much  more  likely  to  leave  Welfare  for 
work  than  those  recipients  who  have  not  participated  in  such  programs.  Those 
former  Workfare  participants  who  do  obtain  employment  usually  end  up  with 
wages  well  below  the  official  poverty  line  (Gueron  and  Pauly,  1991  and 
Friedlander  and  Burtless,  1995). 
Supporters  of  the  values  argument  would  probably  counter  that  simply 
getting  people  into  the  workforce  will  put  them  on  the  road  to  success,  while 
Welfare  is  a  dead  end.  We  have  three  responses  to  this  argument.  First,  hard 
work  is  no  guarantee  of  long  run  success  in  the  labor  market.  From  the  values 
perspective,  one  could  say  that  it  is an  individual’s  responsibility  to  improve  her 
15 skills.  However,  someone  in  a  desperate  situation  working  two  minimum  wage 
jobs  to  keep  her  family  above  the  poverty  line,  would  not  have  much  time  to 
enhance  her  skills.  Low wage  poverty  could  in this  case  be  self-perpetuating. 
Second,  low  wage  employment  has  detrimental  social  consequences. 
Elliot  Currie  (1985)  found  that  underemployment  is,  in  fact,  more  closely 
associated  with  crime  than  unemployment. 
Third,  if Workfare  does  provide  benefits,  they  are  long  delayed.  Currently, 
in  no  state  do  Welfare  benefits  raise  income  to  the  poverty  line  (Center  on 
Social  Welfare  Policy  and  Law,  1996a).  This  could  last  up  to  five  years  and  still 
the  recipient  may  not  be  able  to find  a job  that  pays  above  the  poverty  line  when 
leaving  the  program.  Therefore,  Workfare  risks  making  participants  work  through 
years  of poverty  only  to  end  up  still  poor.  It holds  recipients  to  a moral  obligation 
to  work  for  subsistence,  but  does  not  hold  anyone  to  the  obligation  to  pay 
subsistence  wages. 
C. The  Minimum  Waae 
The  minimum  wage  is  another  strategy  to  reduce  poverty.  It has  recently 
been  increased  to  $5.15  per  hour,  approximately  $10,000  per  year  before  taxes. 
However,  it would  have  to  be  increased  much  further  -- to  about  $7.89  per  hour 
-  to  bring  wages  to  the  poverty  line.  In  1994  (the  latest  year  for  which  data  are 
avilable)  the  official  poverty  line  for  a family  of  four  was  $15,141  per  year  (U.S. 
Department  of Commerce/Bureau  of the  Census,  1996). 
16 Clearly,  an  increased  minimum  wage  is  not  aimed  at  those  who  are 
physically  unable  to  work.  Assisting  this  group  would  require  a  separate 
program. 
It could  be  somewhat  more  effective  for  single  parents,  although  it  does 
nothing  directly  to  make  work  easier  for  single  parents.  It  could  make  it  more 
affordable  for  single  parents  to  find  childcare  and  increase  their  willingness  to 
work.  However  providing  daycare  without  driving  living  standards  back  below  the 
poverty  line  would  require  either  a  further  increase  in  the  minimum  wage  or  a 
government  funded  daycare  program. 
If the  cause  of poverty  is inadequate  demand  for  labor,  the  minimum  wage 
approach  is  an  unappealing  solution  by  itself.  It  does  nothing  for  the 
unemployed.  On  the  surface,  the  minimum  wage  looks  like  an  appealing  solution 
if  inadequate  demand  for  labor  causes  wages  to  drop  below  the  poverty  line. 
However,  even  though  it  increases  wages  for  those  who  can  find  jobs,  it  does 
not  directly  expand  demand  for  labor,  and,  some  argue,  it  might  reduce  the 
amount  of  labor  demanded  causing  an  increase  in unemployment. 
A  proponent  of  the  low  level  of  human  capital  view  is  not  likely  to  find 
much  to  approve  of  regarding  the  minimum  wage  approach,  because  it does  not 
directly  enhance  human  capital.  It would  treat  the  symptom  but  not  the  cause  of 
the  problem. 
A  higher  minimum  wage  would  have  limited  appeal  for  someone  who 
believes  poverty  is  primarily  caused  by  a  lack  of  work  ethic  on  the  part  of  the 
poor.  Lawrence  Mead  (1992)  argues  that  the  poor,  even  the  working  poor,  can 
17 bring  themselves  out  of  poverty,  if  they  take  advantages  of  opportunities  that 
already  exist  to  improve  their  skills.  A  minimum  wage,  does  increase  the 
incentive  to  go  to  work,  but  it  does  not  necessarily  enough  to  bring  everyone 
with  “bad  values”  out  to work. 
Our  view  of  the  minimum  wage  is  mixed.  It  is  certainly  the  case  that  the 
government  could  increase  the  minimum  wage  enough  to  bring  those  working  for 
it above  the  poverty  line.  This  would  be  consistent  with  the  idea  of  a  reciprocal 
moral  obligation  for  employers.  However,  there  is  conflicting  evidence  whether 
the  minimum  wage  causes  increased  unemployment.  Brown  (1988)  found  that  it 
does,  especially  among  “minorities”  and  the  unskilled,  implying  that  a  higher 
minimum  wage  would  move  some  out  of  poverty  and  others  into  it.  Card  and 
Krueger’s  (1995)  results  suggest  that  we  should  question  the  link  between  the 
minimum  wage  and  unemployment.  Castillo-Freeman  and  Freeman  (1991)  find 
evidence  that  small  changes  in  the  minimum  wage  do  not  cause  significant 
increases  in  unemployment  but  large  changes  do.  To  increase  the  minimum 
wage  to  $7.89  per  hour  would  be  a 53  percent  increase  from  where  it is now  and 
86  percent  from  where  it was  in  1995.  There  is  no  certainty  whether  this  would 
increase  unemployment,  but  it  does  not  help  the  unemployed.  To  eliminate 
poverty  the  minimum  wage  would  have  to  be  combined  with  other  policies  to 
help  the  unemployed  and  those  who  are  unable  to  work.  The  Guaranteed 
Income,  which  gives  low-wage  workers  market  power  to  command  a living  wage, 
and  which  helps  the  working  poor  and  the  unemployed  alike,  is  a  simpler  and 
more  comprehensive  strategy  to  achieve  the  goal  of higher  wages. 
18 D.  Separatino  the  “Deserving”  and  “Undeserving”  poor 
The  current  social  insurance  system  is  based  largely  on  the  belief  that 
there  are  not  one  but  many  causes  of  poverty,  allowing  us  to  categorize  the 
poor,  not  by  how  poor  they  are,  but  by  how  “deserving”  they  are.  People  who 
advocate  this  policy  typically  believe  that  those  who  cannot  work  (either  because 
of  disability  or  unemployment)  are  the  “deserving”  poor  while  those  who  simply 
do  not  work,  are  the  “undeserving”  poor  (Zastro,  1986).  The  strategy  then 
becomes  to  categorize  the  poor  by  the  cause  of  their  poverty,  create  a  different 
solution  for  each  deserving  category,  and  encourage  the  undeserving  poor  to 
get  a job.  If it works  perfectly  all  of  those  who  cannot  work  will  be  helped,  while 
all  those  who  can  work  will  have  no  work  disincentives.  As  we  discuss  below, 
this  definition  leaves  out  some  one  who  does  not  work  because  of  unacceptable 
working  conditions. 
This  strategy  offers  a  complex  solution  to  a  complex  problem,  employing 
each  of  the  strategies  discussed  in  parts  A,  B,  and  C  as  part  of  an  enormous 
system  of  incomplete  and  overlapping  programs  as  summarized  in table  1. : 
Table  1: 
Cateqory  (cause) 
Physically  unable  to work 
Program 
Social  Security,  SSI,  Medicare, 
Worker’s  Compensation,  Medicaid 
Single  parents  TANF,  public  housing,  Medicaid,  Food 
Stamps 
Unemployment  Unemployment  Insurance,  food  stamps, 
public  housing,  Medicaid 
Low wages  The  minimum wage,  food  stamps,  public 
housing,  Medicaid,  the  earned  income 
tax credit 
inadequate  Human capital  Public  education,  some counseling  as a 
part of TANF  and other  programs 
Lack of work  ethic  Employment  Counseling 
i-_n  ’  , Despite  the  large  number  of  programs,  they  are  not  enough  to  eliminate  poverty 
or  even  to  bring  all  workers  out  of  poverty;  remember  that  10  percent  of working 
adults  have  incomes  below  the  poverty  line  (Kim,  1997).  Each  program  has  its 
own  eligibility  requirements,  making  it  difficult  for  people  in  need  to  know  what 
they  might  qualify  for.  Simply  having  low  or  no  income  does  not  qualify  someone 
for  these  programs,  and  many  poor  people  fail  to  qualify  for  any  assistance  at 
all. 
The  current  method  is  not  cost-effective.  According  to  Frank  Levy  (1987) 
in  1984,  only  one  fifth  of  government  transfer  payments  went  to  means  tested 
programs  specifically  aimed  at  the  poor.  In  1996,  the  U.S.  spent  744  billion 
dollars  on  income  assistance  (see  table  2). Table  2: Government  income assistance  spending,  1996 
Program  Cost (in billions  of dollars) 
Social  Security 
Income  Security  220 
Housing Assistance  27 
Food I Nutrition  39 
Other  Income  Security 
Unemployment  Compensation  26 
Total  744 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census  (1996) The  categorical  approach  has  been  the  basis  for  our  social  Welfare 
system  since  the  great  depression.  Although  it has  had  many  successes  and  has 
helped  to  reduce  poverty  especially  among  the  elderly,  we  believe  it is clear  that 
this  approach  has  proven  to  be  extremely  expensive  and  not  completely 
effective.  The  rest  of  this  section  discusses  four  reasons  why  the  categorical 
approach  is  not  efficient  or  effective:  first,  the  problem  with  defining  “deserving,” 
second,  the  cost  of  categorizing  each  person,  third,  the  harsh  penalty  for  the 
undeserving,  fourth,  the  effect  of this  position  on  the  of workers. 
First,  how  can  one  accurately  define  “deserving?”  But,  even  if we  accept 
the  distinction  between  those  who  cannot  and  do  not  work,  how  can  we  agree  on 
who  is  able  to  work?  Most  would  agree  that  a  person  with  a  severe 
developmental  disability  or  someone  with  a  profound  case  of  schizophrenia  is 
unable  to  work,  but  it  is  harder  to  agree  about  milder  disabilities?  A  blind 
psychiatrist  can  still  work  but  not  a blind  factory  worker.  Does  being  blind  make  a 
person  deserving?  Once  being  a single  mother  was  considered  “deserving”  now 
it is not.  We  cannot  expect  society  to  determine  a consistent  agreeable  definition 
of need. 
21 Second,  once  a  definition  of  need  is  determined,  it  is  costly  to  separate 
each  person  into  categories  of  need.  The  effort  involved  in  categorization  is 
expensive  and  there  are  significant  costs  to  making  mistakes,  Our  social  Welfare 
system  has  numerous  overlapping  programs  all  with  the  same  ultimate  goal. 
Each  program  has  its  own  eligibility  requirements  making  it  expensive  for  the 
government  to  determine  who  is qualified  for  which  program,  and  it is difficult  for 
needy  persons  to  determine  which  programs  they  may  be  eligible  for.  Programs 
vary  greatly  in  the  portion  of  total  spending  taken  up  by  administrative  costs, 
some  being  surprisingly  high.  The  administrative  cost  of  Unemployment 
Insurance  is  more  than  85  percent  of  its  total  budget  while  the  administrative 
costs  of  social  security  is  less  than  1  percent  of  its  total  budget  (House  Ways 
and  Means  Committee,  1992). 
Third,  the  cost  of  making  mistakes  is just  as  important.  Someone  who  is 
actually  deserving  could  be  classified  as  not  deserving  (a  type  1  error),  or 
someone  who  is not  deserving  could  be  classified  as  deserving  (a  type  2  error). 
A  type  1  error  is  someone  “falling  through  the  cracks”  such  as  a  homeless 
person  with  an  undiagnosed  mental  disorder.  Type  2  errors  include  giving 
benefits  to  someone  who  has  a  high  income,  such  as  sending  a  social  security 
check  to  a  retired  billionaire.  Type  2  errors  also  include  giving  benefits  to 
someone  who  has  a  low  income  but  would  otherwise  be  earning  a higher  private 
income,  such  as  a person  who  waits  until  unemployment  runs  out  before  looking 
for  a job. 
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penalty  for  laziness.  Even  if  a  person  is  “truly  undeserving”  should  they  face 
imminent  starvation?  This  makes  the  penalty  for  laziness  more  severe  than  the 
penalty  for  most  crimes  except  murder.  It seems  also  to  retreat  from  the  goal  of 
eliminating  poverty.  Saving  (1997)  characterizes  this  as  “tough  love”  saying  that 
less  redistribution  will  get  more  of  the  poor  into  the  labor  force,  reducing  the 
number  of  the  poor  at  the  cost  of  increasing  the  severity  of  poverty.  Even  if this 
were  an  acceptable  trade  off,  we  doubt  that  it  would  work  once  we  seriously 
consider  its effects  on  the  labor  market. 
Which  brings  us  to  the  fourth  problem  with  the  categorical  strategy.  It 
hurts  the  market  position  of  all  laborers.  Requiring  everyone  to  work  increases 
the  supply  (or  reduces  the  market  power)  of  labor  making  workers  desperate  to 
get  a job  quickly.  We  have  inadequately  attempted  to  solve  these  problems  by 
other  government  action  such  as  the  minimum  wage  and  labor  regulations,  but 
none  solve  the  underlying  problem  that  workers  are  desperate  for  jobs,  but 
employers  are  not  desperate  for  workers.  The  distinction  between  deserving  and 
undeserving  does  not  allow  a  person  the  freedom  to  refuse  a job  because  the 
pay  is  too  low  or  the  working  conditions  unacceptable.  Our  effort  to  impose 
“tough  love”  undermines  out  belief  that  people  who  work  hard  should  be 
rewarded  for  it.  The  definition  that  those  who  work  are  “deserving,”  implies  that 
no  one  who  works  full  time  full  year  should  live  in  poverty,  yet  10  percent  of  our 
workers  do--not  because  they  are  lazy,  but  because  of their  bargaining  position. 
23 This  problem  can  lead  to  a  paradox  of  hard  work.  The  harder  workers 
work,  The  more  labor  there  is in the  market,  and  the  further  wages  will  go  down. 
The  current  system  over-emphasizes  “bad  values”  as  the  cause  of 
poverty.  Workers  may  have  good  values  but  few  opportunities,  and  “bad  values” 
may  be  the  result,  not  the  cause  of  poverty.  People  at  the  low  end  of  the  job 
market  know  that  the  jobs  available  to  them  pay  very  little  and  offer  little  hope  of 
advancement.  A  minimum  wage  job  requires  a single  parent  with  two  children  to 
work  two  jobs  just  to  get  by;  which  could  take  70  to  80  hours  of work  a week  just 
to  reach  the  poverty  line.  This  person  would  not  be  able  to  save  money  to  start 
his  own  business  and  would  not  have  time  outside  of  work  to  learn  skills  to 
improve  her  situation,  It would  take  years  to  advance  out  of  this  situation.  It  is 
not  surprising  that  people  faced  with  these  options  do  not  develop  a strong  work 
ethic.  If we  want  people  to  value  work,  we  must  make  work  valuable  to  them  in 
the  short  run,  not  as  a distant  promise  coming  after  years  of poverty  wages. 
We  believe  that  one  should  not  be  called  “undeserving”  for  choosing  not 
to  work  if the  only  jobs  open  to  them  would  leave  their  families  in  poverty.  We, 
therefore,  search  for  a solution  that  will  give  workers  greater  market  power.  The 
Guaranteed  Income  will  increase  the  market  power  of workers  and  so  it will  help 
the  unemployed  and  working  poor  alike. 
E. Public  Emplovment 
This  idea,  also  known  as  the  public  job  or  the  guaranteed  job  has  been 
proposed  in different  forms  for  many  years.  Hyman  Minsky  proposed  a version  in 
24 1986;  another  version,  the  WPA,  was  introduced  in  the  U.  S.  during  the  Great 
Depression.  A  Comprehensive  version  would  replace  all  transfer  payments  to 
those  able  to  work  (including  TANF,  unemployment  insurance,  the  minimum 
wage,  food  stamps,  and  public  housing)  with  a  government  guarantee  to  hire 
anyone  willing  and  able  to work. 
Obviously  Public  Employment  is  not  aimed  at  those  unable  to  work;  it 
would  have  to  be  combined  with  programs  for  the  elderly  and  disabled  as  part  of 
a  more  comprehensive  strategy  to  eliminate  poverty.  It  would  eliminate  the 
problem  of  separating  the  unemployed  from  the  unwilling  to  work,  but  the 
problem  of  separating  unable  to  work,  from  those  able  to  work  discussed  in  the 
last  section  would  still  be  relevant  unless  it were  combined  with  a  Guaranteed 
Income. 
There  are  a  number  of  ways  that  Public  Employment  could  eliminate 
single  parenthood  as  a  source  of  poverty,  but  not  without  side  effects.  The  jobs 
could  pay  enough  to  enable  workers  to  obtain  private  day  care,  or  they  could 
include  day  care  as  a  fringe  benefit,  or  they  could  arrange  flexible  hours  and 
work-sharing  arrangements  so  that  groups  of workers  could  take  turns  caring  for 
each  other’s  children.  All  of these  create  the  problem  of  separating  parents  from 
children  for  a  significant  amount  of  time,  but  the  alternative  would  be  to  classify 
single  parents  as  “unable  to  work.”  This,  however,  raises  the  controversy  of 
whether  single  parents  should  be  held  responsible  for  working  and  whether  we 
would  be  providing  an  incentive  for  people  to  become  single  parents. 
25 Public  Employment  could  eliminate  both  problems  caused  by  a  low 
demand  for  labor.  It would  directly  eliminate  unemployment,  and,  if it pays  higher 
than  poverty  wages,  it would  eliminate  low  wages  as  well,  by  being  an  effective 
minimum  wage  for  the  private  sector.  However,  if the  wage  is significantly  below 
the  poverty  line  Public  Employment  would  be  ineffective  in  fighting  poverty. 
Workfare  guarantees  a  job  for  single  parents,  but  with  inadequate  wages.  A 
Public  Job  with  health  benefits,  daycare,  and  a  living  wage  would  greatly  reduce 
poverty,  but  a Public  Job  with  wages  similar  to TANF  “benefits”  would  not  reduce 
poverty  and  would  verge  on  being  exploitative.  (The  rest  of  the  discussion  of 
Public  Employment  assumes  it pays  a living  wage.) 
Proponents  of  the  low  level  of  human  capital  view  might  approve  of  this 
approach  with  qualifications.  It could  directly  eliminate  the  symptom  (low  wages), 
but  would  less  directly  address  its  cause.  Public  employees  might  or  might  not 
gain  valuable  work  experience  and  skills  necessary  for  them  to  increase  their 
earnings  if and  when  they  return  to  the  private  sector.  An  extreme  proponent  of 
the  low  human  capital  view  might  fear  that  public  jobs  would  become  “make 
work,”  and  would  not  eventually  lead  to  better  private  sector  jobs.  However,  if 
such  a  problem  arises,  the  system  could  be  readjusted  to  include  a job-training 
program. 
People  who  think  that  the  poor  lack  sufficient  values  might  also  voice 
qualified  approval  of  this  approach.  They  would  see  its  major  weakness  being 
the  difficulty  to  both  guarantee  a job  and  give  people  an  incentive  to  work  hard 
on  that  job.  Could  workers  be fired  for  poor  performance?  If so,  the  job  would  not 
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not  perform  his  job  adequately,  the  problem  of  separating  those  who  cannot 
perform  due  to  mental  disability  from  those  who  simply  do  not  perform 
resurfaces.  An  employer  of  last  resort  may  be  reluctant  to  fire  employees,  but 
workers  who  least  value  hard  work  would  have  incentives  to  try  to  work  as  little 
as  possible.  One  solution  to  this  would  be  to  heavily  supervise  employees,  but 
this  could  increase  cost,  reduce  productivity,  and  develop  an  antagonism 
between  employees  and  management.  However,  like  Workfare,  Public 
Employment  might  socialize  the  poor  into  recognizing  the  value  of work.  It would 
do  this  more  effectively  than  Workfare  because  it would  positively  reward  work 
with  a  higher  than  poverty  income.  Thus,  participants  would  directly  and 
immediately  see  a positive  reward  for  their  labor. 
Our  view  is that  Public  Employment  would  be a vast  improvement  over  the 
current  state  of  affairs,  or  any  of  the  strategies  discussed  above.  Like  the 
Guaranteed  Income  it would  act  as  an  automatic  stabilizer  on  the  economy  and 
would  eliminate  many  of the  sources  of poverty.  However,  there  are  four  reasons 
why  Public  Employment  is not  as  cost  effective  as  the  Guaranteed  Income. 
First,  it relies  on  an  extreme  version  of the  work  ethic  similar  to  Workfare. 
We  say  this  because,  like  Workfare,  a  public  jobs  system  would  require  able- 
bodied  persons  to  work  in  return  for  assistance.  Those  who  refused  to  do  so 
would  not  be  offered  assistance.  We  hasten  to  add,  however,  that  Public 
Employment  with  a living  wage  would  apply  the  extreme  version  of the  work  ethic 
more  fairly  than  the  current  system  does.  This  is  because  it  would  create  a 
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require  people  to  work  for  assistance  but  would  assure  that  the  level  of 
assistance  was  high  enough  to  allow  them  to  escape  poverty. 
Second,  a major  disadvantage  of  Public  Employment  is that  this  would  be 
significantly  more  expensive  than  the  Guaranteed  Income.  In  addition  to  the 
wage  costs,  the  overhead  costs  would  include  supervisors,  materials, 
transportation,  and  planning.  The  actual  cost  of the  program  could  turn  out  to  be 
many  times  the  wages  cost.  Thus,  it  is  likely  to  be  the  most  expensive  of  all 
programs  we  discuss  in  this  paper.  The  Guaranteed  Income,  because  of  its 
simplicity,  would  be  likely  to  have  low  administrative  costs  comparable  to  Social 
Security  as  discussed  above. 
One  could  counter  that  the  cost  of  Public  Employment  would  be 
compensated  by  the  fact  that  participants  would  be  producing.  However, 
participants  would  also  be  giving  up  time  that  they  could  spend  in  job  training, 
starting  a  business,  volunteering,  getting  an  education  or  doing  whatever  it  is 
they  find  valuable.  There  is no  objective  way  to judge  whether  participants  would 
make  more  valuable  use  of their  time  with  a Guaranteed  Job  or with  Guaranteed 
Income  and  thus  no  way  to  objectively  say  that  the  increased  production  of  the 
Public  Employment  approach  would  be worth  its cost.* 
2  Unless the two are introduced  simultaneously  and the authority  experiments  with 
different  wage rates and different  Guaranteed  Income  levels  to find out if the wage needed to 
encourage  workers to switch  is greater than their  productivity. 
28 The  marginal  tax  rate  could  be  reduced  by  collecting  revenue  from  property,  sales, 
or wealth  taxes  while  collecting  less  revenue  from the  income  tax. 
Those  who  believe  poverty  stems  from disability  or single-parent  status  might 
find  the  Guaranteed  Income  approach  appealing.  A  Guaranteed  Income  would 
assure  that  everyone  unable  to  work,  for  any  reason,  would  not  become 
impoverished.  Retirees  could  live off of the  minimum  income,  but would  be assured 
that  the  more  private  savings  they  have  accumulated,  the  better  off they  would  be. 
Some,  however,  advocate  combining  the  Guaranteed  Income  with  a  retirement 
program  or simply  giving  a higher  maximum  supplement  to retirees.  The  Guaranteed 
Income  would  eliminate  the  possibility  that  someone  would  fall  through  the  cracks 
because  someone  truly  unable  to  work,  but  who  does  not  qualify  for  a  particular 
program  under  the  current  system,  would  be  guaranteed  assistance  under  the 
system  we propose. 
The  Guaranteed  Income  would  work  very  well  to  prevent  poverty  if 
inadequate  demand  for  labor  is the  cause  of  poverty,  whether  it causes  low wages 
or  high  unemployment.  The  unemployed  would  be  able  to  live  off  of  the  minimum 
income  until  they  found  another  job,  while  low-wage  workers  would  receive  a 
supplement  bringing  their  income  above  the  poverty  line,  always  making  them  better 
off than  those  who  are not working. 
The  Guaranteed  Income  would  eliminate  many  of the  negative  effects  of  our 
current  policies  for  low demand  for  labor.  Unlike  the  minimum  wage,  it can  not  have 
a negative  effect  on labor  demand.  And  unlike  unemployment  insurance,  it would  not 
encourage  workers  to stay  on until their  benefits  run out nor  leave  them  desperate  to 
32 guarantee  that  no  one’s  income  falls  below  the  poverty  line  for  any  reason,  but 
ensuring  that  the more one  makes,  the better  off one  is. 
There  are  two  important  numbers  in  a  Guaranteed  Income  scheme:  The 
minimum  income  and  the  marginal  tax  rate.  The  minimum  income  (or  the  maximum 
supplement)  is the  amount  of  money  received  by  a  person  who  makes  no  private 
income.  The  marginal  tax  rate  is  the  rate  at  which  the  supplement  is  reduced  or 
private  income  is  taxed  as  private  income  rises.  The  Guaranteed  Income  would 
replace  the  entire  tax  and  benefit  system  with  a  simple  equation.  After  tax  income 
(D)  equals  private  income  (Y)  times  one  minus  the  marginal  tax  rate  (t)  plus  the 
maximum  supplement  (M): 
D=Y(l-t)+M 
The  net tax (T) equals  private  income  (Y) times  the  marginal  tax rate  (t) minus 
the  maximum  supplement  (M).  If the  supplement  is greater  than  private  income  times 
the tax rate,  net taxes  are negative  (the family  is a net recipient  of transfers): 
T=Yt-M 
For  example,  suppose  we  constructed  a  system  with  a  $10,000  guarantee  for  a 
family  of three  and  a  50  percent  marginal  tax  rate  (meaning  that  for  every  dollar  a 
family  earns  they  would  lose  $0.50  of their  supplement  or they  would  pay  $0.50  tax 
on their  private  income).  A family  with  no  private  income  would  receive  the  $10,000 
30 transfer.  If that  family  earned  $2,000  privately,  its  benefits  would  be  reduced  by 
$1000  (50%  of  $2,000)  amounting  to  an  after  tax  income  of  $11,000  ($lO,OOO- 
$1,000+$2,000=$11,000).  If this  family  increased  their  private  earnings  to  $10,000, 
their  after  tax  income  would  be  $15,000.  If this  family  increased  their  earnings  to 
20,000  (the  break  even  point),  they  would  receive  no  subsidy  giving  them  an  after 
tax  income  of  $20,000.  Notice  that  this  family  is  always  economically  better  off 
increasing  its private  earnings  rather  than  relying  solely  on the  income  guarantee. 
Table  3: Hypothetical  tax and  income  schedule 
Private  Income  Net TaxAfter  Tax  Income  Averaae  Tax  Rate 
0  -10,000  10,000  - 
5,000  -7,500  12,500  -150% 
10,000  -5,000  15,000  -50% 
20,0000  0  20,000  0 
30,000  +5,000  25,000  17% 
50,000  +I 5,000  35,000  30% 
100,000  +40,000  60,000  40% 
These  numbers  are  purely  for  illustration.  The  minimum  income  level  and  the 
marginal  tax  rate  would  have  to  be  chosen  based  on  the  poverty  line  and  the 
revenue  available.  Notice  that  although  the  marginal  tax rate  is fairly  high  at 50%  the 
average  tax  rate  is much  lower  for  most  families.  Notice,  although  the  marginal  tax 
rate  is proportional,  the  overall  effect  of the  tax  benefit  system  is quite  progressive. 
31 find  any  job  after  their  benefits  run  out.  A  worker  on  unemployment  has  to  give  up 
her entire  supplement  to take  a job,  and  risks  not being  able  to get  her  benefits  back 
if  she  has  to  quit  her  job.  Suppose  a  recipient  received  $200  a  week  in 
unemployment  insurance.  If they  were  offered  a $250  a week job,  they  would  lose  all 
of  their  unemployment  benefits,  and  start  paying  income  taxes  leaving  them  little 
better  off  and  possibly  worse  off  than  staying  on  unemployment.  A  person  in  the 
same  situation  with  a Guaranteed  Income  could  take  the job  and  see  their  after  tax 
income  rise from  $200  to $325  a week  without  risking  that  they  won’t  be able  to  get 
their  benefits  back  if they  have  to quit their job.  The  Guaranteed  Income  ensures  the 
more  one  works  the  more  one  makes  while  ensuring  that  no  one  fears  complete 
destitution. 
People  who  believe  inadequate  human  capital  causes  poverty  might  voice 
qualified  approval  of  the  Guaranteed  Income.  It  does  not  treat  the  cause,  but  it 
effectively  treats  the  symptom.  It does  little to directly  enhance  human  capital,  simply 
giving  people  enough  money  to meet  their  subsistence  needs.  However,  they  might 
find  something  appealing  in the  approach  because  it would  allow  people  more  time 
to  allocate  to  attempts  to  enhance  their  levels  of  human  capital.  If  people  were 
assured  that  their  subsistence  needs  would  be met whether  they  worked  or not, they 
would  be  in  a  position  to  devote  more  of  their  time  to  training  and  other  activities 
which  would  increase  their  levels  of human  capital.  Such  a person  would  have  more 
opportunity  to  increase  her  human  capital  than  a  minimum  wage  worker  today  who 
would  have  to  work  two  jobs  to  keep  a family  of  three  above  the  poverty  line  and 
would  have  nearly  no  time  available  to  increase  her  skills.  Also,  the  Guaranteed 
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funding.  This  combination  would  be superior  to Workfare  because  it would  offer  both 
a  long-term  and  a  short-term  solution  to  poverty  caused  by  inadequate  human 
capital. 
The  strongest  opposition  to the  Guaranteed  Income  is likely  to come  from the 
perspective  that  a  lack  of  work  ethic  causes  poverty.  Some  might  make  this 
argument  directly,  others  indirectly. 
The  strongest  objection  to  the  Guaranteed  Income  would  come  from  people 
who  directly  contend  that  the  lack  of  a work  ethic  causes  poverty.  They  would  say 
that  a  policy  providing  enough  money  for  people’s  basic  needs,  would  result  in  a 
severe  work  disincentive.  We  would  not  be  able  to  get  enough  people  to  work  to 
create  the things  needed  to sustain  us as a society. 
This  is  an  important  objection.  However,  there  are  three  problems  with  it, 
which  we  discuss  in turn.  First,  it relies  on  a very  strong  and  unrealistic  assumption 
about  people’s  aversion  to  work.  Second,  it  relies  on  an  extreme  and  one-sided 
version  of the work  ethic.  Third,  it ignores  the  incentive  effects  on businesses.  Unlike 
the  present  system,  the  Guaranteed  Income  would  always  provide  an  incentive  for 
people  to  work  and  earn  more  if  they  could,  because  no  matter  what  a  person 
earned  they  would  always  be better  off earning  more.  The  Guaranteed  Income  is a 
lump  sum  transfer  (the  poor  receive  it  as  a  grant,  others  receive  it  as  a  tax 
deduction)  and  so  itself  causes  no  inefficiency;  inefficiency  could  only  be caused  by 
collecting  taxes  to support  it. It has  a work  disincentive  only  in the  sense  that  one  is 
34 not  completely  destitute  if one  does  not  work,  but  it counters  that  with  a  significant 
reward  if someone  does  work. 
As  mentioned  above,  the  incentive  to  work  for  a  person  receiving  a 
Guaranteed  Income  removes  some work  disincentives  that  many  of our  current  anti- 
poverty  programs  have.  TANF,  food  stamps,  unemployment  insurance,  even  public 
housing  are  all very  difficult  to qualify  for.  However,  if something  is difficult  to obtain, 
it is risky  to give  it up.  In a Guaranteed  Income  system  a worker  takes  no  risk when 
he takes  a job.  This  would  greatly  reduce  the  ‘cycle  of dependency”  problem. 
A  supporter  of  the  “bad  values”  view  of  poverty  might  respond  using  the 
extreme  version  of  the  work  ethic:  able-bodied  persons  are  obligated  to  work  for 
their  subsistence.  Those  who  hold  this  view  tend  to  be  ambivalent  about  or  to 
oppose  poverty  policies  that  provide  able-bodied  poor  people  with  assistance 
without  requiring  them  to work  for  it. We  are  neither  ambivalent  about  nor  opposed 
to such  policies,  for two reasons. 
First,  as  we  have  said  it  is  one  sided  to  hold  individuals  who  do  not  own 
property  to  a  moral  obligation  to  work  without  holding  society  to  a  reciprocal  moral 
obligation.  There  are two ways  to solve  this  inconsistency.  Either  increase  the  moral 
obligation  of  employers  (as  the  minimum  wage  and  public  jobs  attempt  to  do)  or 
decrease  the  moral  obligation  on the  part of workers.  We  believe  the  second  is more 
effective  because  there  is little  evidence  that  people  have  the  bad  values  it is often 
assumed  they  do.  On  the  whole  people  will  work  if given  incentive  to  do  so,  and 
people  are  happier  and  better  workers  if they  chose  to  work  rather  than  if they  are 
forced  to work.  Remember  as cited  above,  that  10 percent  of American  workers  live 
35 in poverty  despite  working  full  time;  this  implies  that  some  Americans  have  such  a 
strong  work  ethic  that  they  are willing  to work  even  though  there  is little  incentive  to 
do  so.  Even  before  TANF,  when  AFDC  had  no  time  limits,  most  recipients  were  off 
public  assistance  in  less  than  three  years.  The  times  and  places  where  one  does 
see  a  “cycle  of  dependency”  tend  to  be  where  there  are  few  opportunities  in  the 
private  sector  (Handler  and  Hasenfeld,  1997). 
Second,  property  rights  to natural  resources  cannot  be created  by trade;  they 
are  created  by  society  because  they  are  useful.  Property  rights  are  not  an  end  in 
themselves  but  a means  to  the  end  of sustaining  our  community.  People  own  land 
and  resources  and  the  goods  we make from them  because  governments  have  made 
laws defining  and  protecting  ownership.  We  do this  because  allowing  people  to own 
“the fruits  of their  labor”  provides  an  incentive  for  people  to  labor.  Thus,  to the  extent 
that  our  sustenance  depends  on  enough  people  having  an  incentive  to  work  and 
invest,  allowing  people  to  own  the  things  they  have  worked  for  provides  them  with 
an  incentive  to  engage  in  that  activity  on  which  our  very  existence  depends. 
Property  rights  and  market  exchange  are  useful  and  justifiable  if  and  only  if they 
serve  society.  But, they  do  not  serve  everyone  in society.  Some  segment  of society 
always  seems  to be  left out.  Our  understanding  of the  labor  market  is what  leads  us 
to this  conclusion. 
Recall  that  neither  Keynesian  nor  Neoclassical  theory  necessarily  imply  that 
the  labor  market  will  provide  above  poverty  wages  for  everyone  who  wants  to work. 
Recall  that  in the  absence  of a redistribution  scheme  workers  are desperate  to work, 
but  employers  are  not  as  desperate  for workers,  causing  a tendency  for  low wages 
36 in  the  least  skilled  labor  markets.  There  is  no  way  to  hold  workers  to  a  moral 
obligation  to work without  putting  them  in this  desperate  situation.  The  most effective 
way  to  increase  the  living  standards  of  workers  is  to  remove  the  desperation  by 
providing  a  minimum  Guaranteed  Income.  Although  the  Guaranteed  Income 
provides  a supplement  for non-workers  and workers  alike,  its main function  is to give 
low-wage  workers  the  market  power  to  command  higher  wages.  If,  as  people  so 
often  fear,  a large  number  of low wage  workers  attempted  to quit their jobs  to  live off 
of the  minimum  income,  the  market  would  respond  with  higher  wages  to  coax  them 
back  to work.  Even  if wages  did  not  rise enough  that  everyone  would  chose  to work, 
wages  would  rise  enough  so  that  the  hard  working  would  be  significantly  better  off 
than  they  are  under  the  current  system  and  significantly  better  off  than  those  who 
lived off the  minimum  income. 
Many  people  make  the  values  argument  indirectly.  Since  the work  ethic  is so 
strong  in our  society,  we  should  advocate  poverty  policies  that  are  consistent  with 
this  ethic.  A  Guaranteed  Income  is  not  consistent  with  the  work  ethic  because  it 
provides  people  with  “something  for  nothing.”  For this  reason,  even  if a Guaranteed 
Income  plan  were  to  be  enacted,  the  income  guarantee  would  not  be  set  high 
enough  to meet  subsistence  needs.  Politicians  and  the  public  would  not be willing  to 
give  non-working  people  a  lot  of  governmental  assistance.  A  poverty  policy  that 
involved  the  government  in the  creation  of public  sector  jobs  would  not  run  into  this 
problem.  Poor  persons  who  took  these  jobs  would  be working  for their  subsistence, 
and  politicians  and  the  public  would  be  willing  to  reward  them  with  higher  income 
than  would  be  the  case  under  a  Guaranteed  Income  plan.  The  implication  is  that 
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would  end  up better  off under  a public jobs  scheme  than  a Guaranteed  Income  plan. 
We  agree  that  politicians  and  the  public  might  be willing  to give  more  money 
under  a  Public  Employment  approach  than  under  a  Guaranteed  Income  approach. 
This  does  not necessarily  mean,  however,  that  recipients  would  receive  more  money 
or would  be better  off. As we argued  above,  the  Public  Employment  approach  is very 
expensive.  Taxpayers  must  be  willing  to  give  not  only  more,  but  enough  more  to 
cover  the  added  expense  of supervisors,  materials,  and  all the  other  overhead  cost 
of  the  Public  Employment  approach.  Public  jobs  are  likely  to  be  so  much  more 
expensive  and  inefficient  that  it is doubtful  whether  people  would  be willing  to  give 
enough  more  to  make  sure  that  recipients  would  actually  receive  more  wages  than 
they  would  under  the  Guaranteed  Income.  Even  if they  did,  they  still  might  not  be 
better  off because  work  is a costly  activity.  With  work  often  comes  travel  costs,  child 
care  costs,  the  cost of time  lost, and  other  costs.  The  money  used  to purchase  these 
cannot  be  used  to  purchase  food,  shelter,  clothing,  and  other  goods/services.  If 
these  things  are  taken  into  account,  wages  would  have  to  be  significant/y  higher 
before  we  could  say  that  recipients  would  be better  off with  a guaranteed  job  than  a 
Guaranteed  Income. 
CONCLUSION 
Currently,  states  across  the  nation  are  in the  process  of  implementing  the 
recently  enacted  Welfare  reform.  This  law  requires  those  on  Welfare  to  work  in 
return  for  benefits,  and  it  limits  the  amount  of  time  recipients  are  eligible  to 
38 receive  benefits  to five  years  over  their  entire  lifetimes  (Center  on  Social  Welfare 
Policy  and  Law,  1996b). 
We  are  doubtful  that  this  approach  will  do  much  to  curtail  poverty.  In fact, 
it might  actually  exacerbate  it. As  more  people  are  pushed  off  the  Welfare  rolls, 
they  will  face  increased  pressure  to  compete  in  the  labor  market,  putting 
downward  pressure  on  wages.  Thus,  at  best,  the  result  of  the  recently  passed 
Welfare  reform  law  might  simply  be to  swell  the  ranks  of the  working  poor. 
One  who  believes  that  the  value  of work  is that  it can  provide  workers  with 
a  better  life,  would  be  distressed  by  this.  It  is  not  necessary  to  have  poverty 
especially  among  workers  in  a  country  this  rich.  If  the  goal  is  to  eliminate 
poverty,  the  Guaranteed  Income  is the  most  efficient  and  comprehensive  means. 
In the  end,  the  issue  is a  normative  one.  Should  our  society  be  so  committed  to 
the  work  ethic  that  we  view  work,  even  at  poverty  wages,  as  better  than  public 
assistance?  No,  eliminating  poverty  is  so  important  that  everyone  deserves  the 
resources  required  to  meet  their  basic  needs.  We  should  reward  the  work  ethic, 
not  enforce  the  work  ethic. 
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